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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH

CITY CONSUMER SERVICES, INC.,
a New Jersey Corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 880453
vs.
VERA HESS PETERS,

Priority No. 14(b)

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1988, as
amended).
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment granted by
the trial court in favor of City Consumer Services, Inc.

The

Motion was granted by Judge Douglas L. Cornaby of the Second
Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, on
November 18, 1988.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court properly rule that City

Consumer Services, Inc. (hereafter "CCS") was entitled to
Summary Judgment as there were no material issues of fact.
2.
of law?

Is CCS entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter

3.

Was the trial court's award of attorney's fees

and costs to CCS proper?
RELEVANT STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Sale of trust property bv
trustee - Action to recover balance due upon obligation for
which trust deed was given as security — Collection of costs
and attorney's fees.
At any time within three months after any
sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon
the obligation for which the trust deed was
given as security, and in such action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount
of the indebtedness which was secured by
such trust deed, the amount for which such
property was sold, and the fair market value
thereof at the date of sale. Before
rendering judgment, the court shall find the
fair market value at the date of sale of the
property sold. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which
the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the sale. In any
action brought under this section, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to
collect its costs and reasonable attorney
fees incurred in bringing an action under
this section.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1.
Judgment — Special Execution.

Form of Action —

There can be one action for the recovery of
any debt or the enforcement of any rights
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall
be given adjudging the amount due, with
costs and disbursements and the sale of
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to
satisfy said amount and accruing costs, and
directing the sheriff to proceed and sale

the same according to the provisions of law
relating to sales on execution, and a
special execution or order of sale shall be
issued for that purpose.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in
favor of Respondent, CCS, by the Second District Court in Davis
County.
Course of Proceedings Below
Respondent, CCS, filed suit against Vera Hess Peters
(hereafter "Peters") in Second District Court in October,
1987.

Following completion of discovery, CCS filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment.

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby granted CCS'

motion on September 28, 1988.

Peters appeals from that

Judgment.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
In April of 1981, Peters executed a Note (the "Note")
in the amount of $19,500.00 in favor of CCS. According to the
terms of the Note, Peters was obligated to make payments on the
Note beginning June 5, 1981 and continuing until the obligation
was paid in full.

Peters' obligation was secured by a Deed of

Trust (the "Lien") on the real property located at 1245 Siesta
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property").

As consideration

for the execution of the Note, CCS released funds in the amount
of $19,500.00 to Peters.

(R. 2).

In October of 1986, Peters became delinquent on her
payment schedule and CCS began sending her delinquency notices
and demands for payment.

Despite CCS's numerous demands for

payment, Peters failed and refused to make the payments that
were due on the Note.

On June 22, 1987, the lien was

eliminated by the foreclosure of a senior lienholder.

(R. 2-3).

Based on an examination of appraisals of the Property,
costs and expenses of carrying and selling the Property and the
amount of its loan, CCS decided not to bid at the senior
lienholder*s foreclosure sale as there was no equity in the
property to satisfy Peters' obligation.

(R. 3 ) .

CCS filed an action on the Note in Second District
Court on October 21, 1987.

(R. 1). On August 18, 1988, CCS

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Memorandum in Support of
Motion and the Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett.

(R. 19-31).

Peters filed a Memorandum in Opposition to CCS's Summary
Judgment Motion on September 12, 1988.

(R. 34-43).

On

September 20, 1988, CCS filed a Response to Defendant's
Memorandum and a Motion to Strike Peters' Memorandum in
Opposition on the grounds that Peters did not comply with Rule
2.8(b) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah (R. 59-68) (the "Rules of
Practice").

Specifically, CCS argued that Peters' Memorandum

failed to specify the facts in dispute as required by Rule
2.8(e) of the Rules of Practice and that the Memorandum was not

filed within the ten day limit prescribed by Rule 2.8(b) of the
Rules of Practice,

(R. 59-61).

Oral argument was heard by the Court on September 27,
1988, and on September 28, 1988, the Court granted CCS's Motion
for Summary Judgment, but found that Peters was entitled to a
hearing on what constituted reasonable attorney's fees.

(R.

79) .
On October 24, 1988 CCS filed a Motion for
Determination of Attorney's Fees and an Affidavit of J. Scott
Lundberg, including an Exhibit itemizing the fees incurred.
(R. 84-92).

After a hearing on the Motion on November 1, 1988,

the Court awarded the attorney's fees sought by CCS with the
exception that the time of attorney J. Scott Lundberg be
reduced to a rate of $100.00 per hour.

(R. 93). The Court

entered Summary Judgment on November 21, 1988, and Peters filed
this appeal.

(R. 94-96)•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

CCS' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly granted
below.

The affidavit of Kathleen Hackett and the Memorandum

filed by CCS supported the conclusion that there were no
material issues of fact.

Additionally, CCS* facts were

uncontroverted as Peters failed to file opposing affidavits.
According to this court in Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Development Company, 659 P-2d 1040 (Utah 1983), once the
moving party has established a case for summary judgment the

opponent "must file responsive affidavits raising factual
issues, or risk the trial court's conclusion that there are no
factual issues, . . . " id. at 1044.
CCS was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of
law.

The Utah "one-action" rule is inapplicable on these

facts, or in the alternative, CCS is within the exception to
the rule.

Likewise, the deficiency statute is inapplicable on

the facts before this court.

The deficiency statute regulates

the creditor who elects to sell the property to satisfy the
debt and then seeks further relief against the debtor.

As CCS

never foreclosed its interest in the property, the statute is
inapplicable to this action.
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Beckstrom v.
Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978), held that the trial
court's discretion in awarding attorneys' fees will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.

The

facts below establish that CCS presented evidence on the
reasonableness of the claimed fees and the trial court made a
determination.

As Peters failed to establish any facts

constituting abuse of discretion, the trial court's judgment
should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
The standard of review to be applied by an appellate
court where summary judgment is granted below is well
established:

Our inquiry on review is whether there is any genuine
issue as to any material fact, and if there is not,
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Rule 57(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Fredrick May & Co., Inc. v. Dunn, 368 P.2d
266 (Utah 1962); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (Utah 1960).
The defendant cannot rely upon the mere allegations or
denials of her pleadings to avoid a summary judgment
but must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial, Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979).
CCS established through uncontroverted testimony and
evidence, the lack of any material issue of fact.
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Further, it

Therefore, the

trial court's decision should be affirmed.

POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BELOW WHERE THE
RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT THE FACTS WERE UNCONTROVERTED.
Appellant argues that summary judgment in favor of CCS
was inappropriate as factual issues remained in dispute.
Appellant's argument is erroneous for several reasons.
A.

The Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett Supports Summary
Judgment in Favor of CCS,
CCS filed a memorandum supporting its motion for

summary judgment.

The memorandum set forth fifteen undisputed

material facts and included the required citations to the
supporting portions of the record.
Additionally, CCS filed the affidavit of an employee,
Kathleen Hackett.

As the individual responsible for collecting

the delinquent account of Peters, Hackett asserted facts based
on her personal knowledge of the delinquency and collection of
the account-

Specifically, Hackett stated that after reviewing

an appraisal of the property's value, the amounts due on the
existing liens and the carrying costs and costs of
reconditioning and marketing, CCS decided not to bid at the
senior's foreclosure sale.

(R. 31).

Hackett's affidavit supports CCS' allegations that the
senior foreclosed and eliminated its junior lien and that the
security was lost through no fault of CCS'.
B.

Peters Failed to Establish Controverting Facts.
Summary Judgment was appropriate on the record before

the court.

CCS submitted memorandum and supporting affidavits

to establish that there were no factual disputes.
1.

Peters Failed To File Opposing Affidavits.

In spite of the facts established by CCS through the
Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett, Peters failed to submit opposing
affidavits.

This appeared to be a factor in the court's ruling

on the motion for Summary Judgment as the court stated:
The defendant did not file any affidavits
controverting the facts set forth in the
Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett. The
defendant relied on allegations and denials
in his pleadings. This is insufficient to
show there is an issue of fact.
(R. 79).
Appellant cites Lockhart v. Equitable Realty Company,
658 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983), and argues that it was unnecessary

for Peters to submit affidavits opposing Kathleen Hackett's
testimony.

Lockhart, however, is distinguishable.

In that case, the plaintiff was a second position
lienholder who disclaimed any interest in the property and
initiated a deficiency action before the senior lienholder1s
sale.

Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of Lockhart, the defendant appealed arguing that the
plaintiff was barred from recovering for failure to comply with
the Utah "one-action" rule. The Utah Supreme Court reversed
the trial court and held:
In the instant case, defendants' affirmative
defense and motion to dismiss, based upon
Lockhart's failure to comply with the
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-37-1,
precludes the granting of summary judgment
in favor of Lockhart. Lockhart concedes
that it has abandoned the security prior to
the disposition of Zions' foreclosure.
(Emphasis added).
Id- at 1335.
The court based its holding precluding summary
judgment on the fact that Lockhart "conceded" that it had
abandoned its security and filed its deficiency action before
the senior lienholder had foreclosed;
It was, therefore, unnecessary for
defendants to submit opposing affidavits as
to this issue in order to comply with Rule
56(e), supra, because the issue . . . was
uncontroverted by Lockhart's affidavits.
Id. at 1335.

The case at bar is distinguishable as CCS not only
controverted the allegations in Peters' pleadings, but
established through Hackett's affidavit and various documents
that no material issues of fact existed.
Utah case law requires opposing affidavits to avoid
summary judgment where the moving party has established facts
supporting a summary disposition of the case.

In Franklin

Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040
(Utah 1983)/ the vendor of an apartment complex brought suit to
foreclose a contract of sale and recover the amounts due under
the contract and several promissory notes.
The vendors moved for and were granted summary
judgment after the defendants failed to file opposing
affidavits and memorandum.

The property was sold and the

vendors retained all the proceeds of the sale.

Three junior

lienholders appealed seeking a share of the sale proceeds and
challenging the vendor's priority position.
On appeal, the lienholders argued that summary
judgment was inappropriate as there were genuine issues of
material fact appearing on the face of the affidavits submitted
by the vendors.

Specifically/ the appellants pointed to the

fact that while a modification agreement was covered in the
vendor's affidavits, the effect of the modification on the
interest rates in the underlying obligation was never
addressed.

Noting the deficiency in the movant's affidavit.

the court, nevertheless, affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment and stated:
The opponent of the motion, once a prima
facie case for summary judgment has been
made, must file responsive affidavits
raising factual issues, or risk the trial
court's conclusion that there are no factual
issues, . • •
Id, at 1044, The court elaborated on the necessity of opposing
affidavits:
Thus, when a party opposes a properly
supported motion for summary judgment and
fails to file any responsive affidavits or
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule
56(e), the trial court may properly conclude
that there are no genuine issues of fact
unless the face of the movant's affidavit
affirmatively discusses the existence of
such an issue.
Id.
Applied to the facts of this case/ Peter was not
required to submit opposing affidavits; however, by failing to
controvert CCS" version of the facts established by Kathleen
Hacketfs affidavit, Peters left the court to decide only
whether the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
2.

Peters Responsive Memorandum To CCS' Motion For
Summary Judgment Was Deficient.

The record establishes that CCS filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on August 18, 1988. The Motion was
accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of the Motion, and an
affidavit.

Peters failed to file her Memorandum in Opposition

to Summary Judgment until September 12, 1988. On September 20,
1988, CCS filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
grounds that Peters memorandum was not filed within the ten
(10) day limit prescribed by Rule 2.8(b) of the Rules of
Practice.

More importantly, when viewed in conjunction with

Peters' failure to file opposing affidavits, Peters' memorandum
failed to specify the facts in dispute or refer with
particularity to the portions of the record she relied on as
required by Rule 2.8(e) of the Rules of Practice.
Although the trial court failed to rule on CCS' Motion
to Strike, it granted CCS' Motion for Summary Judgment on the
grounds that Peters relied on allegations and denials in
pleadings that were insufficient to establish that there was an
issue of fact.

This court has repeatedly held that non-movants

cannot rely on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings to
overcome contrary evidence established by affidavits, but must
set forth specific facts establishing a genuine issue for
trial.

Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983); Thornock

v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979).

As Peters failed to

accomplish this below, summary judgment was properly granted.
C.

Assuming, Arguendo, Some Facts Were in Dispute, There
Were No Material Issues of Fact Precluding CCS' Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate when viewing all of
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
the record establishes that were are no material issues of
fact.

Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979).

The key

phrase in the standard for summary judgment is "material issues
of fact."

According to the Utah Supreme Court:

The mere existence of genuine issues of fact
in the case as a whole does not preclude
entry of summary judgment if those issues
are immaterial to resolution of the case.
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah
1982) .
Applied to the facts of this case, assuming, arguendo
that some facts were in dispute, the material facts were not in
dispute.

Kathleen Hackett's affidavit establishes that Peters

defaulted on her mortgage payments to CCS and that the senior
lienholder foreclosed on or about June 22, 1987, eliminating
CCS' lien on the property.

(R. 20-21).

The legal conclusion

from these facts is that CCS' interest in the property was
eliminated by the foreclosure of the first lienholder.

At this

point, CCS* only option was to bid at the seniors' foreclosure
sale; a futile exercise based on CCS' appraisals of the
property, the amount due on the first lien, costs to carry the
property and costs of marketing.
As Peters failed to controvert any of the material
issues established by CCS, summary judgment was properly
granted by the trial court.

POINT II
CCS WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
Once this court is satisfied that there are no issues
of material fact precluding summary judgment it must then
determine whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law,

CCS established, through uncontroverted

testimony and evidence, the lack of any material issue of
fact.

Further, CCS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

as more fully set forth below.
A.

CCS' Claim Does Not Violate the "One-Action Rule."
The "one-action ruleM is found in Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-37-1 (1953, as amended), and provides that "there can be
one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate."

While

the rule refers to mortgages, it is well established that the
provision applies to trust deeds as well.
Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980).

See Utah Mortgage &
The rule allows a

lender to pursue a borrower on a deficiency claim only after
the collateral has been exhausted through foreclosure by the
lender or a senior lienholder.

First Security Bank of Utah v.

Pelger, 658 F.Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987); Lockhart v. Eguitable
Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983).
1.

Compliance With The MOne-ActionM Rule Is Not A
Question of Fact Precluding Summary Judgment.

Appellant cites Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Black, 618
P.2d 43 (Utah 1980), and argues that compliance with the
one-action rule is a guestion of fact precluding summary
judgment.

Appellant's reliance on Black is misplaced as the

case is distinguishable from the facts before this court.
In Black, the debtor executed a promissory note in
favor of the creditor, Utah Mortgage, in exchange for a
subdivision loan.

The note was secured by a trust deed on the

property that was to be subdivided.

The trust deed provided

that the trustee could reconvey "all or any part" of the
property upon written request by Utah Mortgage.

According to

affidavits filed on behalf of Utah Mortgage, this provision was
requested by the Blacks and agreed to by Utah Mortgage.
Pursuant to the agreement, the lots were released and
the proceeds were applied to the loan. After releasing all of
the lots and applying all the proceeds, a $36,760.01 deficiency
remained.

Utah Mortgage brought suit and Black moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff failed to comply
with the Mone-action rule."

The trial court granted the motion

and Utah Mortgage appealed.
This court held that summary judgment was improperly
granted below where there was a dispute as to a material issue.
The critical question here is whether, as
defendants contend, the plaintiff had 'sole
discretion1 as to whether, and for what
amounts, it would release the lots; or, as
the plaintiff contends, the defendants both
agreed to and requested that the lots be

released on payments of the amounts . . •
which did not aggregate enough to pay for
the defendant's debt.
Id. at 45-46.
The court went on to explain why the issue was
important:
We proceed upon the premise, . . . that when
a creditor uses up the security which it was
agreed would stand good for his debt, he may
not look to the debtor personally for any
deficiency. In any event, that principle
would not apply when the security has been
lost or disposed of without any fault or
blameworthy conduct on the sort of creditor
(plaintiff here.) In such instance, an
action may be brought upon the note without
going through a fruitless procedure of
foreclosure on non-existent security.
Id. at 45.
Thus, the fact was undisputed that Utah Mortgage had
"used up the security which it agreed would stand good for the
debt.M

After determining that the creditor had released its

security, a question of fact existed as to whether the action
constituted fault or blameworthy conduct sufficient to warrant
a violation of the "one-action rule." On this basis, Black is
distinguishable.
In the case at bar, the facts are undisputed that CCS
did not "use up the security."

CCS did not release the

security rather, the evidence supports the trial court's
conclusion:

That rule [the one-action rule] is not
applicable in this case. There was a senior
lien foreclosure of the property on June 22,
1987. The plaintiff did not bid at the sale
because it made the judgment that there was
not an economic justification for doing so.
After the sale there was no property to
foreclose on. The plaintiff is not required
to go through a fruitless procedure.
Judge Cornaby's Ruling on Motion for summary
Judgment. (R. 79)•
This is not a case where compliance with the
"one-action rule" is a question of fact precluding summary
judgment.
2.

The (Incontroverted Evidence Establishes That The
"One-Action Rule" Is Inapplicable Because the
Senior Lienholder Foreclosed Eliminating CCS'
Interest.

It is well established that the goal of foreclosure is
to put the foreclosure purchaser in the position that the
mortgagor was in at the time the foreclosed mortgage was
executed.

1 BYU Legal Studies/ Summary of Utah Real Property

Law at 418 (1978).

This goal is accomplished by terminating

all interests junior to the mortgage being foreclosed.

G.

Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages § 319 (2d ed. 1970).
Thus, if a senior lienholder forecloses, and all junior
mortgagees are properly joined, the junior mortgages are
eliminated.
Appellant's argument seems to suggest that the
one-action rule requires a junior lienholder to bid at the
foreclosure sale of a senior lienholder or be precluded from

pursuing the borrower on the Note. While, as a practical
matter, a junior position lienholder may bid at a senior's
foreclosure in order to foreclose its own trust deed and
collect the equity in the property, the statute does not
require such actions by a junior lienholder.

The statute

merely requires that a lender exhaust the security before
proceeding against the borrower.

A sale by a senior lienholder

eliminates all junior liens. The junior's note is no longer
secured; thus, there is no security to exhaust and the junior
lienholder should be allowed to seek relief on the Note.
Applied to the facts of this case, the evidence below
establishes that CCS held a second position lien on the
property.

When Peters defaulted on her obligation to the

senior lienholder, the senior foreclosed and terminated CCS'
interest.

(R. 21). The "one-action rule" is, therefore,

inapplicable because CCS' interest was extinguished.
3.

Assuming, Arguendo, That The "One-Action Rule" Is
Applicable, The Evidence Establishes That The
Exception To The "One-Action Rule" Is Controlling
In This Case.

If this court rules that the one-action rule requires
a junior lienholder to bid at a foreclosure sale by the senior
lienholder, the trial court's decision should, nevertheless, be
affirmed if CCS comes within the exception to the one-action
rule.

The Utah Supreme Court explained the purpose of the
"one-action rule", and the underlying public policy concerns in
Utah Mortgage & Loan Co, v. Black, 628 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980):
The purpose of the statute was to eliminate
harassment of debtor and multiple litigation
which sometimes occurred under the
common-law rule which allowed a creditor to
foreclose and sell the land, and to sue on
the note. The statute limits the creditor
to one remedy in exhausting his security
before having recourse to the debtor for a
deficiency.
Black, 618 P.2d at 45.
Thus, the purpose of the rule is to protect debtors
from multitudinous lawsuits; however, the court went on to
explain that the protection of the statute is unnecessary and
the rule is inapplicable "when the security has been lost or
disposed of without any fault or blameworthy conduct on the
part of the creditor."

id. at 45.

The exception was further discussed and applied in
First Security Bank of Utah v. Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175 (D. Utah
1987).

There, First Security brought an action to collect on a

promissory note that was secured by a second trust deed after
foreclosing on the property under a first trust deed.

The

defendants argued that because First Security failed to
foreclose the second trust deed before seeking a deficiency it
was barred, under the "one-action rule," from recovery.
Rejecting this argument and upholding summary judgment in favor
of First Security, the court reiterated:

a creditor is precluded from seeking a
deficiency only where the creditor's
negligence or illegal conduct has resulted
in the loss of the collateral, or where the
creditor voluntarily released the junior
lien.
Id. at 182.
Applying the exception, the court held that First
Security's actions were not negligent or blameworthy where it
appraised the property and relied in good faith on the
appraisal in deciding to extinguish the second lien and bring
an action on the note. id.

The court noted that the

application of the rule would not serve the public policy
concerns underlying the statute and stated, "The 'one-action
rule' was enacted to prevent double recovery by creditors, not
to completely deny recovery of a legal debt."

Id.

In the case at bar, the rule is likewise
inapplicable.

The facts establish that on June 22, 1987, the

senior lienholder foreclosed, eliminated CCS' junior lien, and
prompted CCS to initiate this action against Peters to recover
on the debt.

After reviewing appraisals of the property, the

costs and expenses of carrying and selling the property and the
amount of its loan, CCS elected not to bid at the foreclosure
sale by the senior lienholder due to its belief that there was
no "real" equity for it remaining to satisfy the Note.
(R. 21). As in First Security Bank v. Feloer, CCS obtained an
appraisal and relied on it in good faith in deciding not to bid
at the foreclosure sale by a senior lienholder.

Additionally,

CCS went through a detailed analysis of anticipated costs and
expenses to cure Peters* default and market the property.
Thus, its actions are not blameworthy,

Id. at 182.

Although Peters would have the Court believe that
there was sufficient equity in the property to cover the amount
due to CCS, that approach simply ignores the considerations
required to be taken into account by a junior lienholder in
such a situation.

The junior lienholder would have to advance

its own funds to pay off the debt owing to the senior
lienholder.

It would thereby tie up funds which could

otherwise be lent out at market rates.

It must take into

account the actual costs it would incur in managing,
reconditioning and preparing the Property for marketing.

It

must also consider the actual costs it would incur in selling
the Property.
Assuming 6 to 12 months would be required to market
the property at the appraised value, and assuming that CCS
could receive 10% return on money loaned in the market place,
the cost to plaintiff of paying off the senior lien would run
between $2,500 and $5,000.
In order to match the commissions of ten percent (10%)
now being offered by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development on repossessed homes, CCS would pay approximately
$7,000.00, assuming the property were marketed at its appraised
value of $70,250.00.

Experience has shown over the past couple of years
that properties listed for sale are not bringing the appraised
value.

Therefore, it is unlikely that the Property could have

been marketed by CCS for $70/250. Further evidence that the
real value of the property was not $70/250 can be seen in the
fact that despite the supposed equity of $20,000, no one else
bid at the foreclosure by the senior lienholder.
In addition to the costs of marketing and paying off
the senior lien, and questions regarding the real value, CCS
was faced with the likelihood of expenses to put the Property
into marketable condition.

The appraisal was done without

access to the Property's interior.

CCS would not be

unreasonable in anticipating additional costs of repair and
maintenance.

Additionally, as the Property is a part of a

condominium project, CCS would be faced with common area
assessments if it took back the Property.

Those items would

also reduce the perceived equity.
After reviewing the costs associated with "protecting"
its secured position on the property, CCS concluded that it was
economically unjustifiable to do so. That determination cannot
be viewed as "fault" on the part of CCS.

If CCS had failed to

engage in that exercise, perhaps "fault" could be found.
However, CCS engaged in a careful review of the situation and
made a reasonable decision under the circumstances.

The only

fault in this case lies with Peters who defaulted in payments
under the terms of the Note.
Appellant attempts to compare this case to Lockhart v.
Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983).
Lockhart is distinguishable.

However,

In Lockhart, the creditor held a

note secured by a second position trust deed.

When the senior

lienholder foreclosed Lockhart disclaimed any interest in the
property and initiated a deficiency action prior to the senior
lien foreclosure sale. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Lockhart and the debtor appealed arguing
that the "one-action rule" barred Lockhart from recovering a
deficiency,

Id. at 1334. Lockhart responded that its actions

were protected under the exception to the "one-action rule."
Id. at 1335.

Reversing the lower court's decision, the Utah

Supreme Court held that the exception to the "one-action rule"
was inapplicable because Lockhart had commenced the action on
the note before the senior lienholder had foreclosed and before
a deficiency had been determined.

Id. at 1336. The court drew

a distinction between the facts of Lockhart, where the
deficiency action was initiated prior to the foreclosure by the
first lienholder, and the facts of Cache Valley Banking Co. v.
Logan, 56 P.2d 1046 (Utah 1936), where the deficiency was
initiated after the foreclosure sale. The court held:
[I]t is not enough to speculate that the
security is valueless, or might become
valueless if foreclosed by the senior
lienholder. Rather, the security must be,

in fact, exhausted and a deficiency
established to a certainty in order for the
exception to apply.
Id. at 1336.
The case currently before this court is closer
factually to Cache Vallev Banking Co. than Lockhart.

CCS did

not speculate that their security might become valueless,
rather, the senior lienholder foreclosed and extinguished CCS'
interest.

Once the security was exhausted and Peters'

deficiency was established to a certainty, CCS brought suit for
the deficiency.

(R. 79).

Surely the purpose of the Utah "one-action rule" was
not to force a lender to go through an expensive, time
consuming and fruitless procedure to collect on a loan made in
good faith but where the security has depleted due to market
forces.

The Mone-action rule" was not intended to bar

legitimate deficiency claims.

"The 'one-action rule' was

enacted to prevent double recovery by creditors, not to
completely deny recovery of a legal debt."

Felger, 658 F.

Supp. at 82. The uncontroverted facts establish that CCS is
not seeking double recovery in this case. Application of the
rule, as urged by appellant, would allow Peters to avoid her
legal obligation to CCS.
B.

CCS' Claim Does Not Violate The Deficiency Statute.
Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953, as

amended) (the "deficiency statute") sets forth a procedure for

recovering the balance remaining on an obligation following a
sale of the trust property.

The statute is applicable to

actions commenced "after any sale of property under a trust
deed . . . to recover the balance due upon the obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security. . . ."
According to this Court:
[S]ection 57-1-32 provides the exclusive
procedure for securing a deficiency judgment
following a trustee's sale of the real
property under a trust deed. Plaintiffs'
election to sell the property to satisfy the
debt precludes them from seeking any other
remedy, including damages for breach of
contract, which might have been available to
them.
Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985).
The statute by its very terms is inapplicable to CCS
as CCS has never foreclosed on the property.

Rather, CCS'

interest was eliminated by the foreclosure of the first
lienholder.

While the statute would be applicable to the

senior lienholder's actions to collect any remaining
obligation, the Legislature did not contemplate that the
statute be enforced against a lender whose security interest
was eliminated by the foreclosure of a senior lienholder's
interest.
Appellant's argument amounts to a plea for the Court
to create an anti-deficiency statute based on the fact that
Utah has a "one-action rule." The State of Utah does not have
statutory or case law authority supporting anti-deficiency

protection for borrowers.

The law merely requires that a

creditor that forecloses under a deed of trust must pursue any
remaining deficiency pursuant to the terms of the statute.
Where, as here, the collateral is exhausted by a senior
lienholder, the statute is inapplicable to the junior's action
on the Note.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED FEES AND COSTS TO CCS.
Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of CCS, CCS filed a Motion for Determination of
Attorney's Fees.

Additionally, CCS filed a supporting

affidavit by J. Scott Lundberg, the attorney who handled the
case, including an exhibit itemizing the attorney's fees and
costs.

At the hearing, Peters' attorney, Ephraim H.

Frankhauser, objected to several of the costs reflected in the
Exhibit; however, the parties stipulated to the award of $83.00
in costs.

(Transcript p. 3-5).

Respondent's counsel also challenged the
reasonableness of CCS' attorneys' fees on the basis of the
hourly billing rate and the total amount of time spent on the
matter.

Following testimony by Mr. Lundberg, the court awarded

costs and attorneys' fees of $2,329.25. This figure represents
the $83.00 stipulated to by the parties and CCS' claimed
attorneys' fees except that Mr. Lundberg's billing rate for

10.25 hours was reduced from $120.00 per hour to $100.00 per
hour.
The Utah Supreme Court considered a trial court's
award of attorneys' fees and the appropriate standard of review
in Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978).

There,

the court held that the trial court is endowed with
considerable discretion, and in the absence of clear abuse of
discretion, this court will not disturb a trial court's
judgment.

Jd. at 524.
Similarly in Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah

1984), this court held:
Where the parties have agreed by contract to
the payment of attorney fees, the court may
award reasonable fees in accordance with the
terms of the parties' agreement. The amount
to be awarded is largely within the sound
discretion of the trial court, . . .
Id. at 858.
Applied to the facts of this case, appellant has
failed to point to any part of the record that would support an
argument that the trial court abused its discretion.

The facts

establish that irrespective of Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the parties stipulated to the costs to be
included in the judgment, and the court heard evidence and
adjusted an hourly billing rate in making a determination on
the reasonableness of the claimed attorneys' fees.
court's judgment should be affirmed.

The trial

CONCLUSION
The material issues of fact were uncontroverted, and
CCS was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; thus,
appellant CCS respectfully petitions this Court to affirm the
trial court's grant of summary judgment.
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